Biosmog a écrit :
La palme revient à la truffe du forum, le tartuffe expert comptable en chef, qui nous parle d'une statistique dont il ne se rappelle plus où il explique que les sociologues sont tous marxistes.
J’ai cité de mémoire un truc lu il y a des années dans un article en anglais. La citation était je l’admets plus qu’approximative mais précisait bien que la statistique visait les US... mais bon vu comme ça t’a énervé je me pardonne
Quoi qu’il en soit, je n’ai pas retrouvé l’article en question lu à l’époque mais bien il me semble l’étude qu’il relayait. Y a une de tes consœurs parmi les auteurs, une suédoise, Charlotta Stern, tu connais ?
Bref, reconnaissons nos torts, dans mon souvenir approximatif, ça parlait de
sociology, il s’agissait en fait de
social psychology, dieu me pardonne !
Cela dit, si je peux me permettre d’en livrer un extrait ici :
Citation:
4.1. Confirmation bias
People tend to search for evidence that will confirm their existing beliefs while also ignoring or downplaying discon- firming evidence. This confirmation bias (Nickerson 199
is widespread among both lay people and scientists (Ioannidis 2012). It is extremely difficult to avoid confirma- tion bias in everyday reasoning; for example, courses in crit- ical thinking, temporarily suppress confirmation bias, but do not eliminate it (Lilienfeld et al. 2009). Even research communities of highly intelligent and well-meaning indi- viduals can fall prey to confirmation bias, as IQ is positively correlated with the number of reasons people find to support their own side in an argument, and is uncorrelated with the (much lower) number of reasons people find to support the opposing argument (Perkins et al. 1991).
Confirmation bias can become even stronger when people confront questions that trigger moral emotions and concerns about group identity (Haidt 2001; 2012). Further, group-polarization often exacerbates extremism in echo chambers (Lamm & Myers 197
. Indeed, people are far better at identifying the flaws in other people’s evi- dence-gathering than in their own, especially if those other people have dissimilar beliefs (e.g., Mercier & Sperber 2011; Sperber et al. 2010). Although such processes may be beneficial for communities whose goal is social cohesion (e.g., a religious or activist movement), they can be devas- tating for scientific communities by leading to widely ac- cepted claims that reflect the scientific community’s blind spots more than they reflect justified scientific conclusions (see, e.g., the three risk points discussed
The peer-review process likely offers much less protection against error when the community of peers is politically homogeneous. Ideally, reviewers should scrutinize and crit- icize the methods of a paper equally closely regardless of whether or not they approve of the findings. Yet, confirma- tion biases would lead reviewers to work extra hard to find flaws with papers whose conclusions they dislike, and to be more permissive about methodological issues when they endorse the conclusions. This is exactly what has been found in experimental studies (Abramowitz et al. 1975; Ceci et al. 1985; both described
In this way, certain assumptions, theories, and findings can become the entrenched wisdom in a field, not because they are correct but because they have consistently undergone less critical scrutiny. When most people in a field share the same confirmation bias, that field is at a higher risk of reaching unjustified conclusions. The most obvious cure for this problem is to increase the viewpoint diversity of the field. Nobody has found a way to eradicate confirmation bias in individuals (Lilienfeld et al. 2009), but we can diversify the field to the point where individual viewpoint biases begin to cancel out each other.
Comment ne pas donner de crédit à l’idée qu’une
science molle puisse être affectée par le fait qu’une importante majorité de ceux qui la produisent partagent une idéologie commune, comment ne pas comprendre que cela puisse interroger sur la légitimité de ses conclusions ? Ta posture de victime d’un anti-intellectualisme primaire n’est pas tenable, ce n’est pas le tartuffe de backstage qui écrit les lignes ci-dessus, cette critique est portée par des gens arborant le même écusson de premier de la classe que toi.
Voilà qui aura le mérite au moins de nous éloigner de l’islamo-gauchisme...
